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performance challenges related to these protection schemes under varied network op-
erational conditions and the nature of DER generator and interface technologies.
Emphasis is placed on the importance of dynamic testing that can only be delivered 
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To this end, the combination of ﬂ exible network operation and new DER technologies 
underlines the importance of utilising the laboratory testing facilities available within 
the DERlab Network of Excellence. This not only informs the shaping of new protection 
testing and network integration practices by end users but also enables the process of 
de-risking new DER protection technologies.
In order to support the issues discussed in the white paper, a comparative case study 
between UK and German DER protection and scheme testing practices is presented. 
This also highlights the level of complexity associated with standardisation and approval 
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ABSTRACT 
This white book provides an insight into the issues surrounding the impact of increasing 
levels of DER on the generator and network protection and the resulting necessary 
improvements in protection testing practices. Particular focus is placed on ever increasing 
inverter-interfaced DER installations and the challenges of utility network integration. This 
white book should also serve as a starting point for specifying DER protection testing 
requirements and procedures. 
A comprehensive review of international DER protection practices, standards and 
recommendations is presented. This is accompanied by the identification of the main 
performance challenges related to these protection schemes under varied network operational 
conditions and the nature of DER generator and interface technologies.  
Emphasis is placed on the importance of dynamic testing that can only be delivered through 
laboratory-based platforms such as real-time simulators, integrated substation automation 
infrastructure and flexible, inverter-equipped testing microgrids. 
As DER technologies and operating conditions become more complex, novel DER and 
network protection schemes may be required. Barriers to their deployment are investigated 
while discussing integration strategies for new protection technologies through effective 
testing. Observations are also made where protection policy deficiencies exist to cater for 
such schemes. 
To this end, the combination of flexible network operation and new DER technologies 
underlines the importance of utilising the laboratory testing facilities available within the 
DERlab Network of Excellence. This not only informs the shaping of new protection testing 
and network integration practices by end users but also enables the process of de-risking new 
DER protection technologies. 
In order to support the issues discussed in the white paper, a comparative case study between 
UK and German DER protection and scheme testing practices is presented. This also 
highlights the level of complexity associated with standardisation and approval mechanisms 
adopted by different countries. 
 
  - 3 - 
CONTENT 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 5 
2 Impact of DER on power and protection system performance .......................................................... 6 
2.1 Scope............................................................................................................................................. 6 
2.2 DER technology and practices ...................................................................................................... 6 
2.3 Impact of DER installation ........................................................................................................... 7 
2.3.1 Power flow direction and voltage regulation.......................................................................... 7 
2.3.2 Dynamic response of different types of DER......................................................................... 8 
2.3.3 DER connection arrangements ............................................................................................. 10 
2.4 DER Protection ........................................................................................................................... 12 
2.4.1 Example protection arrangements and settings (UK) ........................................................... 12 
2.4.2 Example protection arrangements and settings (Germany) .................................................. 14 
2.4.3 Brief review of practices in different countries .................................................................... 17 
3 Challenges to protection performance.............................................................................................. 19 
3.1 Introduction................................................................................................................................. 19 
3.2 Coordination with utility network protection.............................................................................. 19 
3.2.1 Prevention of nuisance tripping of DER............................................................................... 19 
3.2.2 Coordination issues related with the fault characteristics of DER........................................ 20 
3.2.3 Reclosing coordination and fuse saving ............................................................................... 21 
3.3 Islanding protection..................................................................................................................... 22 
3.3.1 Existing methods .................................................................................................................. 22 
3.3.2 Improved islanding detection techniques ............................................................................. 23 
3.4 Coordination with Fault ride-through (FRT) .............................................................................. 27 
3.5 Validation challenges of improved DER protection techniques ................................................. 28 
4 Different types of protection testing................................................................................................. 30 
4.1 Introduction................................................................................................................................. 30 
4.2 Type testing classification........................................................................................................... 30 
  - 4 - 
4.2.1 Static type testing.................................................................................................................. 32 
4.2.2 Dynamic type testing ............................................................................................................ 33 
4.3 Approaches to approvals and standardisation ............................................................................. 35 
4.3.1 Approaches to approval [Germany]...................................................................................... 35 
4.3.2 Approaches to approval [United Kingdom].......................................................................... 35 
5 Test case study ................................................................................................................................. 36 
5.1 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 36 
5.2 System model and test scenarios................................................................................................. 37 
5.2.1 System model........................................................................................................................ 37 
5.2.2 Test scenarios........................................................................................................................ 38 
5.3 Test results .................................................................................................................................. 41 
5.3.1 Undervoltage testing by applying faults (phase A to ground) in islanded mode.................. 41 
5.3.2 Overvoltage testing by load shedding in islanded mode ...................................................... 41 
5.3.3 Underfrequency testing by islanding (DER unit supplying a high load).............................. 41 
5.3.4 Overfrequency testing by islanding (DER unit supplying a low load) ................................. 42 
5.3.5 ROCOF testing by simulating an islanding condition .......................................................... 42 
5.4 Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 42 
6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 43 
References .................................................................................................................................................. 44 
List of FIGURES........................................................................................................................................ 48 
appendix: System model data ..................................................................................................................... 49 
 
  - 5 - 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Power system protection is a safety critical component of all electrical systems, and therefore, 
testing and validation have always been of vital importance. In a conventionally designed 
electrical system, the emphasis in terms of reliability has always been placed on the transmission 
system level protection, where very stringent and detailed type testing procedures and 
regulations have been developed over many years of engineering practice. Distribution system 
protection, due to the passive nature of the network, cost constraints and lesser impact on the 
stability and safety of the overall system, has always been designed in a simpler manner and the 
testing requirements were, therefore, less demanding. With the swiftly increasing penetration of 
various electrical energy sources at all distribution levels, conventional protection schemes and 
the procedures for their testing and validation are often insufficient. A number of limitations and 
issues of existing protection practice have been already identified in the technical literature. 
Some of these problems can be addressed with small alterations of existing practice, while others 
call for the development of new protection techniques or, at the very least, the use of existing 
transmission type protection schemes. 
This white book aims to review the main DER related protection system issues and known 
solutions in future distribution systems with a diverse mixture of energy sources. In particular, 
testing procedures are emphasised as a way of ensuring sufficient protection system reliability 
and performance.  
The document is organised as follows:  
− Section 2 reviews the existing Distributed Energy Resources (DER) technologies in terms 
of their performance in general, and dynamic response to network faults in particular. A 
short review of typical DER connection and protection arrangements is also included.  
− Section 3 outlines the main challenges to protection system (both network and DER 
related) and discusses a number of potential solutions. The need for carefully designed 
validation procedures is emphasised and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) based validation 
methodology is proposed.  
− Section 4 is a comprehensive summary of existing procedures and testing methods of 
protective devices and schemes. 
− Section 5 includes case study results based on real time simulation testing of a DER 
protection relay. For comparison purposes the tests were performed using German and 
UK recommended settings. 
− Section 6 includes the main findings and recommendations for testing of DER protection. 
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2 IMPACT OF DER ON POWER AND PROTECTION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE  
2.1 Scope 
The level of penetration of DER, particularly Renewable Energy Sources (RES), is set to 
increase dramatically over the next 30 years [1]. DER is normally defined to be the generation 
which is connected to an MV/LV distribution system, targeted to meet the local customer 
demand. However, some power supply or storage systems connected to the transmission level, 
which are not controlled by the utility, can also be regarded as DER, e.g. wind farms in Scotland 
connected at 132kV, where the total power production substantially exceeds the demand of local 
customers [2]. Hence, the definition of DER in this paper captures a wide scale of both small and 
large power sources.  
2.2 DER technology and practices  
DER covers a broad range of technologies, including diesel generators, gas turbines, micro-
turbines, CHP, fuel cells, small hydro plants, wind turbines, biomass generators and photovoltaic 
generators. In addition, DER also encompasses energy storage systems such as batteries and 
flywheels as they can be used to harness excess electricity produced by the most efficient 
generators during low load levels [3]. 
Although RES are the preferred class of DER that should be used in meeting the demand of EU 
energy policy, their implementation and penetration in existing power systems is limited by local 
environmental conditions and their intermittent nature. The utilisation of the wind resource is 
relatively low in countries such as Norway, France and the UK compared to Denmark, Germany, 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland. In Norway and France there is less concern about greenhouse gas 
emissions due to the high contribution of hydro power (Norway) and nuclear power (France), but 
there is a need for a greater diversity in the generation mix. The UK is very dependent on 
conventional thermal generation, especially from coal and gas [4], and there is a great emphasis 
on growing the contribution of DER in meeting the overall system demand. To meet the 
government’s 2020 renewables target, large volumes of onshore and offshore wind generation 
are expected to be constructed, whilst, nuclear energy would also be considered in the long-term 
development [5]. Spain and Portugal have ambitious objectives for wind power growth. In 
Denmark and Germany, there is a tendency to develop off-shore wind farms due to the 
increasing difficulties in finding appropriate locations for on-shore installations [3].  
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2.3 Impact of DER installation 
Understanding of the characteristics of different types of DER and their impact on the power 
system, including steady state and dynamic system performance, is essential to the design of 
effective DER protection and control arrangements. The main issues with respect to system 
operation and protection in light of DER installations are listed below: 
? Conventional distribution systems are designed as radial systems with unidirectional 
power and fault current flows. The addition of DER results in bi-directional power flows 
and in fault current infeeds from “downstream” generation in some cases, which may 
require modified and/or additional protection provisions. 
? Varied fault contributions from different types of DER make traditional overcurrent 
grading more challenging. 
? Network voltage profile and regulation can be affected by DER. 
? Inappropriate grounding arrangements may result especially during intentional islanding. 
? Out of synch auto-reclosure due to frequency drifts caused by DER following initial 
disconnection from the main grid (e.g. resulting from fault clearance). 
2.3.1 Power flow direction and voltage regulation 
Most distribution systems operate in a radial configuration, which results in unidirectional power 
flows and this means that overcurrent protection or fuses can normally be used for correct fault 
detection and isolation. However, the installation of DERs may cause bi-directional power and 
fault current flows, which is uncertain due to their generating capacity, mode of interfacing to the 
system, operating mode, and load conditions. Graded overcurrent protection may therefore 
become ineffective in providing selective fault isolation. The problems that were only applicable 
to transmission systems are becoming more evident in distribution systems.   
Conventional voltage regulation in distribution systems is normally achieved through Load-Tap-
Change (LTC) transformers in the substations, and sometimes enhanced by switching capacitor 
banks [6]. This regulation method is based on the fact that power flow is always uni-directional 
from grid substations to the end of feeders. The presence of DER could have a significant impact 
on voltage profile, which depends on the DER technology, control method, location and level of 
power generated [7], [8]. When one DER suddenly connects or disconnects from the system, 
abrupt change of voltage profile (overvoltage or undervoltage) might cause undesirable tripping 
of network protection devices and/or other DER interface protection systems. Hence, when DER 
has a significant impact on maintaining system stability and security, i.e. wind parks connected 
to the transmission level, capability of Low Voltage Ride Through (LVRT) or Fault Ride 
Through (FRT) is mandatory [61]. These requirements have been specified in several grid codes 
including Irish Electrical Code [6] and the German Grid Code [63]. Furthermore, in the light of 
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significant increase of penetration of DER in the medium-voltage network, FRT capability 
becomes also required at this level according the German technical guidelines in [12]. 
2.3.2 Dynamic response of different types of DER 
Synchronous machine 
Most conventional thermal generators as well as CHP microgeneration driven by reciprocating 
engines utilise three-phase synchronous machines. Under steady state operation, a DC source is 
used for excitation. A synchronous generator always runs at a synchronous speed with a rotor 
angle corresponding to its electrical output power and mechanical input power. When multiple 
synchronous machines are connected in parallel, their rotational speeds and output frequency 
must be synchronised [9]. 
During a transient fault situation, although the electric power output is reduced, the field current 
supported by the excitation system persists, which maintains the voltage in the stator winding 
and in turn supplies a continuous fault current. This results in a sustained short-circuit current 
with a DC offset. As the short circuit current continues to flow in the system, the machine’s 
winding equivalent impedance increases. This results in a faster fault current decay. Three 
reactance variables (subtransient, transient and synchronous) have been introduced by IEEE Std. 
141-1993 to characterise this phenomenon [14]. According to [15], the decaying fault current 
characteristic depends on the fault position and rated power of the machine: close-up faults will 
have longer decay times than remote faults. Even small synchronous machines with limited fault 
current capability can produce up to three times full load output after a relatively short decay due 
to their excitation systems. 
Should the grid fail to absorb sufficient amount of generator kinetic energy, gained from 
acceleration during the fault, the synchronous machine becomes unstable (i.e. loses synchronism 
with the rest of the system) after the disturbance is cleared. In this case, suitable protection 
should be provided to detect this instability and disconnect the DER from the utility network 
(e.g. pole slip protection). Alternatively, other methods of improving the transient stability of 
synchronous DER are used and can be found in [3]. 
Induction machine 
Though induction machines are more commonly used as motors in the power system, some DER 
units utilise this type of generator due to their simplicity of construction and ability of producing 
active power at varying rotor speeds. They are often used in wind turbines and some micro hydro 
generators. The prime mover drives the induction machine rotor above the synchronous speed, 
thus producing active power that is exported to the utility network. 
Since induction machines do not use external DC sources for excitation, the field flux decays 
rapidly on the loss of external source of voltage following a fault condition. Consequently, under 
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symmetrical fault conditions, there is no steady state fault current and the current output rapidly 
decays to zero. Therefore, only a subtransient component exists for induction machines [16]. 
 
Power electronics interfaced machine 
Power electronics can be used as an interface for a wide variety of energy sources. They convert 
the DC energy for connection to the AC system or decouple small rotating machines from the 
network and thus provide more flexibility in terms of machine rotational speed and efficiency of 
energy capture (e.g. wind). Other benefits of power electronic interfaces are their fast control of 
active and reactive power as well as voltage regulation, which can potentially enhance the 
operation of a weak remote network or support intentional islanding [17], [18]. The typical 
arrangements of using a power electronics interface for DER installations are presented in Figure 
2-1. When interfacing with the DC power sources (fuel cells, batteries, etc.), a DC-AC inverter is 
used to regulate the AC output of DER into the grid.  When used with a rotating machine, an 
AC-DC rectifier is added to rectify the uncontrolled AC power source. DC-DC converters are 
almost always found in photovoltaic battery charging systems to regulate and optimise the power 
input [17]. 
 
Figure 2-1: Basic connections of inverter based DER [17] 
The fault behaviour and capability of the inverter is a function of the control design and the size 
of the power electronic components (which are usually influenced by cost). This area is currently 
not completely understood or standardised and there are only limited guidelines as to the 
minimum or recommended fault contribution of an inverter interfaced DER [19]. A number of 
publications demonstrate that the fault current from inverter based DER can be up to two or three 
times the inverter’s full load current for one cycle or less. For example, [16] includes test results 
and discussion of fault characteristics of an inverter interfaced DER which shows that grid 
connected inverters can produce up to 2-4 times the rated current, but only for a very short 
period of 0.06 - 0.25 cycles. This is within the subtransient period for synchronous generators 
and such currents would have little impact on the operation of traditional overcurrent relays. 
Therefore during grid-connected mode there is no detectable impact on the existing protection 
strategies due to the limited fault current contribution. During intentional islanding mode, 
however, alternative schemes which are not based on the fault to load current ratio may be 
required [20]. Furthermore, there may be a problem with inverter’s internal protection reacting 
too quickly and too sensitively to faults on the network; in some cases, a network fault could 
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lead to unnecessary tripping of many inverters and, in an islanded system, this could have severe 
consequences. 
RES with crow-bar protection 
One such example is a doubly-fed induction generator (DFIG). Its fault characteristic is a 
mixture of the response of an asynchronous machine and an inverter-interfaced DER. Crowbar 
protection is often to protect this generator against overcurrents caused by large system 
disturbances or faults. When a fault is detected, the rotor windings are short circuited using 
power electronic ‘crowbar’ switches to limit the rotor current by adding external rotor impedance 
until the fault is cleared. 
2.3.3 DER connection arrangements 
Connection schemes 
DER connection arrangements vary greatly according to different voltage levels, rated power, 
utility system topology and the purpose of DER installation. Generally, different countries have 
different connection arrangements. According to [3], three connection schemes exist – 
connection to a dedicated/non dedicated line; tap connection to a loaded/non loaded line and 
direct connection to a dedicated/non dedicated substation. Typical connection arrangements are 
presented for MV and HV networks and practices in different countries are discussed in [3]. 
 
Interface connection 
The power connection method has a major impact on the dynamic behaviour of the DER. Most 
utilities require a transformer for interconnecting DER to the utility network, however, there are 
also exceptions for direct DER connection. Generally, there are no universally accepted “best” 
arrangements for DER connections, and each type of connection has advantages and 
disadvantages with respect to both circuit design and protection coordination. These are 
summarised in Table 2-1. Furthermore, two methods which represent the most typical 
arrangements in DER installations will be discussed in detail. 
HV Delta (Grid side) and LV grounded Wye (DER side) 
In transmission systems and LV distribution systems, this connection is generally not preferred 
as there is a risk of high voltage potential on the utility side [3]. However, the ungrounded utility 
side has the advantage of minimal impact on the coordination of existing protection relays. This 
connection arrangement is implemented when: 
• Installing a DER in the distribution system where multiple grounding is forbidden (e.g. in 
HV distribution system below 132kV in UK). 
• Adding a DER to an existing transformer connection in an industrial system for export to 
the utility. 
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Table 2-1: Main transformer connections between DER and Utility grid [21] 
DER side 
(LV) 
Grid  side 
(HV) 
Advantages  Disadvantages 
Delta Delta 
Gnd-Wye Delta 
Delta Wye 
Zero sequence isolation between 
DER and Grid ensures no fault 
current infeed from utility side for 
DER winding faults.  Provides no 
fault backfeed from DER side for 
grid fault. 
High voltage potential during 
utility faults. 
Delta Gnd-Wye Reduced voltage potential for grid 
faults. Zero sequence isolation 
between DER and Grid. Easy 
detection of faults at grid side. 
Fewer resonant conditions and 
ferroresonance. 
Creates an unwanted grounding 
source for remote faults in utility 
network 
Gnd-Wye Gnd-Wye No overvoltage for both grid faults 
and DER winding faults. 
No isolation between Grid and 
DER, e.g. DER faults can be 
seen by the utility grid. No 
isolation for third harmonics. 
Directly connected Low cost No isolation between Grid and 
DER. Missing effective 
grounding system during 
islanding. High potential during 
faults. 
 
HV grounded Wye (Grid side) and LV Delta (DER side) 
In transmission systems and LV distribution systems, this connection is recommended by most 
utilities and is widely used in practical installations, which is similar to the arrangements for 
large scale generating plants [3]. It offers a good grounding source for the utility grid, which 
supports high fault currents when a single-phase fault occurs (which is the most common fault 
type in reality).  Thus faults can be easily detected by relays. When DER winding faults occur, 
there will be no additional fault current infeed from the utility side due to the zero sequence 
isolation between HV and LV windings. This connection also isolates third harmonics flowing 
into the grid, which have a negative impact on some sensitive machines. 
This connection arrangement, however, introduces an additional zero sequence grounding 
source. Therefore, a remote grid ground fault can be seen by the interconnection transformer. If 
its ground impedance is low, then the selectivity and reach of protection relays might be affected. 
Moreover, during unbalanced operation, which happens frequently in low voltage distribution 
systems, the unbalanced load current will be divided by the utility grounding transformer and the 
interconnection transformer of DER. Thus, the load carrying capacity of the interconnection 
transformer is reduced during a serious unbalance. 
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Grounding arrangement 
ER G59/2, UK engineering recommendation for the connection of DER, illustrates the 
grounding arrangements in detail [22]. Grounding arrangements depend on the operation mode 
of DER and voltage level of the utility grid it is connected to. For HV distribution systems below 
132kV, multiple grounding sources are normally not permitted. For LV distribution systems, 
multiple grounding is the normal practice and DERs are mostly solidly grounded. 
2.4 DER Protection  
2.4.1 Example protection arrangements and settings (UK) 
Protection arrangements for DER are highly dependent on the voltage level, the normal mode of 
DER operation, DER rated power and the nature of the network which the DER is connected to. 
To this end, ER G59/2, provides guidance on several DER connection cases and their protection. 
In this section, only two typical arrangements will be presented – one for LV connected DER 
that is designed for both islanded and grid-connected operation (Figure 2-2), the other is for HV 
connected DER that is also designed for the same operating modes (Figure 2-3). Other typical 
connection cases are included in ER G59/2 [22] and IEEE 1547-2003 [23]. 
According to current standards and grid codes it is the utility’s responsibility to protect the 
network as opposed to the DER owner. Besides conventional overcurrent protection, neutral 
voltage displacement (NVD) protection is required as a back-up earth fault protection. When it 
comes to the DER and its interface protection, however, it is the DER owner’s responsibility. In 
addition to standard generator protection, the DER owner must ensure that islanding detection is 
applied. Generally, loss of mains (LOM) protection application is mandatory for small DER [22]. 
 
Figure 2-2: DER connected to LV system for islanded and grid-connected operation [22] 
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Figure 2-3: DER connected to HV system for both islanded and grid-connected operation [22] 
 
As shown in Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3, the utility only applies overcurrent protection (with 
NVD functions in the HV case), while the DER owner is responsible for most of the DER 
protection and its coordination with the utility protection. The minimum requirements and 
conditional requirements for interface protection at the utility and customer side are shown in 
Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2: Minimum requirements for protection arrangements 
 Utility equipment DER side equipment 
Minimum 
requirements 
Instantaneous overcurrent (50/50N) 
Time overcurrent (51/51N) 
Under/over voltage (27, 59) 
Under/over frequency (81 U/O) 
Conditional 
requirements 
NVD relay LOM/Anti-islanding relay 
Synch-check  relay 
 
Recommended settings  
Under/over voltage relays 
Under voltage usually occurs when there is a fault in the network. There are several instances 
when an under voltage is detected but should not cause disconnection of the generator, such as a 
fault outside the protective zone; a fault on adjacent lines or even remote lines; increased loading 
and power swings. To maintain stability and reliability of the power supply, and to reduce the 
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chances of nuisance DER tripping, a two-stage under voltage strategy is recommended for all LV 
and HV connected generation [22]. Conversely, to meet Fault-Ride-Through (FRT) capability 
requirements a single stage of delayed under voltage is applied in some cases.  
Over voltage conditions are usually more hazardous compared to under voltage conditions. 
Hence, the time delay settings for over voltage relays are shorter. In addition, there is no similar 
risk of wide-scale blackout related to the overvoltage as there is in the case of under voltage. 
Thereby there are no similar “ride-through” rules that would require less sensitive operation. 
Under/over frequency relays 
A two-stage strategy is also recommended for under/over frequency protection. 
LOM relays 
There is a trade-off between sensitivity and stability when setting LOM protection. The 
recommendations for the application of LOM will be presented in Chapter 3. 
 
Other relays 
In addition to the protection functions discussed above, NVD protection, overcurrent protection, 
directional protection, earth fault protection, reverse power protection, check-synchronism, phase 
unbalanced protection, etc. should be installed according to grid code recommendations or in line 
with local DNO protection policy. The settings of these protection functions should be 
configured according to the recommendation made by the grid code and must take coordination 
with existing network protection into account [22].  
 
2.4.2 Example protection arrangements and settings (Germany) 
MV level 
In the German interconnection requirements for the medium voltage (MV) level [12], an MV 
generating plant is considered to consist of different LV generating units. The generating plant 
can either be connected to a busbar of a transformer substation (case 1) or to the medium voltage 
network (case 2); there are different requirements for each case. 
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Case 1: Generating plants connected to the bus-bar of a transformer substation 
 
Figure 2-4:  Protection applied for the connection of generating plant to the busbar of a transformer 
substation [12], Un = nominal voltage, Uc = voltage agreed on with the operator/customer 
 
 
 
Table 2-3:  Setting range and recommended settings for protective equipment at the network point of 
connection [12] 
Function Setting range Recommended settings 
rise-in-voltage U>> 1.00 – 1.30 Un 1.15 UC ≤ 100 ms 
rise-in-voltage U> 1.00 – 1.30 Un 1.08 UC 1 min 
under-voltage U< 0.10 – 1.00 Un 0.80 UC 2.7 s 
reactive power / 
under-voltage 
Q&U< 0.70 – 1.00 Un 0.85 UC 0.5 s 
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Table 2-4:  Setting range and recommended settings for protective equipment at the generating unit [12] 
Function Setting range Recommended settings 
rise-in-voltage U>> 1.00 – 1.30 Un 1.20 Un ≤ 100 ms 
under-voltage U< 0.10 – 1.00 Un 0.80 Un 1.5 – 2.4 s 
under-voltage U<< 0.10 – 1.00 Un 0.45 Un 300 ms 
rise-in-
frequency 
f> 50.0 – 52.0 Hz 51.5 Hz ≤ 100 ms 
under-frequency f< 47.5 – 50.0 Hz 47.5 Hz ≤ 100 ms 
 
Case 2: Generating plants connected to the medium-voltage network (PCC somewhere in 
the network) 
A figure on the protection arrangement for this case can be found in [12], 
Table 2-5: Setting range and recommended settings for protective equipment at the generating unit [12] 
Function Setting range Recommended settings 
rise-in-voltage U>> 1.00 – 1.30 Un 1.20 Un ≤ 100 ms 
under-voltage U< 0.10 – 1.00 Un 0.80 Un 1.0 s 
under-voltage U<< 0.10 – 1.00 Un 0.45 Un 300 ms 
rise-in-frequency f> 50.0 – 52.0 Hz 51.5 Hz ≤ 100 ms 
under-frequency f< 47.5 – 50.0 Hz 47.5 Hz ≤ 100 ms 
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LV level 
The German interconnection requirements for the low voltage (LV) level are currently under 
revision [24]. 
2.4.3 Brief review of practices in different countries 
Although ER G59/2 provides a relatively generic set of recommendations for DER protection 
arrangements, it is only applicable in the UK and practices in different countries vary [22]. Some 
of these practices are summarised and compared in this section. 
In the UK, the main recommendations for interconnection of DER to the grid are ER G59/2, ER 
G83/1 and ETR 113. The connection arrangements of DER vary with voltage level. At the 33kV 
level, DERs are generally connected to a single busbar of 132kV/33kV or 275kV/33kV 
substations. DERs are connected to mid-points of existing 33kV circuits only with the provision 
of a three-breaker switchboard at the connection point. ROCOF is generally used for LOM 
protection. At the 275/132kV level, large DERs are connected to the grid through one or two 
transformer stages [3]. The transformer is protected according to standard UK practice of biased 
differential and restricted ground fault with mechanical protection and overcurrent backup. 
In Germany,  two recommendations specify the requirements for DER connected to MV and LV 
systems [12], [24]. According to the interconnection requirements for the medium voltage (MV) 
level, an MV generating plant is considered to consist of different LV generating units. The 
generating plant can either be connected to a busbar in a transformer substation or to the medium 
voltage network. Both cases have different requirements. The German interconnection 
requirements for the LV level are currently under revision [24]. 
In Spain, connection arrangements for DERs are specified according to different voltage levels 
and system topologies. The settings of under/over voltage and under/over frequency relays are 
configured based on an “old law” [25]. Otherwise, the configuration of anti-islanding protection 
– mainly by transfer trip from utility breakers – is defined according to different system 
topologies and voltage levels. For connection of DER to a dedicated line automated reclosing is 
generally not necessary as no loss of customers is expected. In 66kV networks or below, line 
voltage check for blocking of the utility breaker closure is normally installed but there are no 
requirements for transfer trip function. In 132kV networks and above, communication aided 
distance protection scheme is utilised to coordinate with the remote line protection. It should be 
noted that teleprotection equipment can be also used to provide transfer trip functionality even 
though anti-islanding protection is not necessary in this case [3]. For connection to a radial non 
dedicated line, transfer trip from the utility circuit breakers is generally necessary to prevent an 
islanded operation [3]. For a tap connection to a two-ended line, for systems below 132 kV level, 
transfer trip is required for both ends of the line [3]. 
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In France, connection arrangements for DER are even more detailed. Legal texts [26] and [27] 
define specific requirements for the connection of “installations” in transmission networks and 
distribution networks, including different types of decoupling protections for DER [28]. 
Regarding distribution level, protection functions are requested in case of tripping on islanding, 
ground and phase-phase faults (in 15kV, 20kV and 30kV system), inter-conductor fault (in 220V 
system), wrong coupling between DER and utility grid, grid fault (in 63kV and 90kV system, 
when DER generated power > 12MW). However, no specific LOM protection is defined [3]. 
In Denmark, most DERs are wind turbines and CHP units. One of the grid operators Eltra has set 
some requirements on protective equipment and settings at local CHP units. Anti-islanding 
protection is in the form of under voltage protection supplemented with a ROCOF function. 
There are also FRT requirements for wind turbines during faults in the transmission grid [3]. 
In Finland, the connection arrangements of DER at the transmission level (≥110 kV) are based 
on the Finnish grid code [29]. At the distribution level, however, with around 100 operators, the 
code is not unified. Many companies have defined or are currently defining – their own 
requirements. Recommendations in [30] published by the Finnish Electricity Association Sener 
have been applied in many cases as a guideline. Motiva Oy has also published recommendations 
for connecting small-scale generation [30]. Organization of Finnish Energy Industries has 
recently published a recommendation on connecting microgeneration to the public grid, which 
has been widely applied to the small-scale units in LV networks [31].  
In Norway, the connection arrangements of DER are based on IEEE standard 1547 [23] ROCOF 
is commonly used for anti-islanding.  
In Portugal, connection schemes for different voltage levels and network topologies are specified 
by Directorate General for Energy Geology (DGEG) in 2007. However no dedicated LOM 
protection is required either [3]. More detailed information about protection practices in different 
countries can be found in Appendix D and E of [3]. 
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3 CHALLENGES TO PROTECTION PERFORMANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
The increase in DER penetration has demonstrated detrimental effects on the performance of 
DER interconnection protection. The main performance issues of existing schemes, such as 
coordination with utility network protection, immunity to remote faults or adjacent disturbances, 
are described in this chapter along with an insight into the main proposed methods for tackling 
these challenges. 
Special attention was paid to the response of inverter-interfaced DER (IIDER) during network 
disturbances and the impact these dynamics (that differ from conventional generator 
technologies) on the performance of generator interface protection. As such, this section focuses 
on the performance of anti-islanding protection and over-current/earth fault protection where the 
main protection challenges are being faced. 
The effective use of laboratory facilities for testing DER interface protection has been discussed 
and emphasis was placed on testing under realistic operational scenarios. Furthermore, 
requirements for the validation of some of the recently proposed protection methods are 
described. 
3.2 Coordination with utility network protection 
The installation of DER has a great impact on the power flow through the system, which brings 
significant challenges to the current grading of conventional overcurrent protection and fuse 
saving. Hence, it raises the issue of coordination between DER interconnection protection and 
utility network protection. 
3.2.1 Prevention of nuisance tripping of DER 
Generally, nuisance tripping of DER can occur due to tripping on large fault current infeed from 
the DER—a sympathetic tripping on adjacent faults; or tripping on transient voltage sag—
tripping on remote disturbances.  
Suitable relay settings can avoid the issue of nuisance tripping on overcurrent. The time delay of 
the relay at DER should be set slower than those on the adjacent lines. Moreover, a directional 
component can be added to the relays on the lines connected to DER, which supports proper 
discrimination. 
For spurious tripping due to voltage sag, the issue is more complicated. The reference [32] 
discusses two available methods. One is to use a delta-wye connection of the transformer at the 
common coupling point, with the delta winding on the utility side. This ensures that the phase-to-
ground voltage of the DER side does not drop below 58%. The other method is to install an 
electronic sag corrector.   
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The first method is reasonably economic, however limited in its effectiveness. Operation at 
0.58pu voltage is well outside the statutory limits, and further this method cannot solve the 
nuisance operation caused by other types of faults in adjacent lines.  The second method seems 
expensive requiring the purchase and installation of a new piece of network equipment. An 
electronic sag corrector is able to maintain the voltage for only three cycles, which means that 
the fault on adjacent lines needs to be cleared in less than 60ms. As in some cases, it is closely 
related with the FRT issue. 
3.2.2 Coordination issues related with the fault characteristics of DER 
It is well know that synchronous and asynchronous based DER units have a great impact on the 
fault level of the whole system. As discussed above, these types of DER contribute a 
considerable amount of fault current during system fault. As a consequence, the sensitivity and 
reach of conventional overcurrent relays are reduced. When a fault occurs in the system, relays 
may fail to detect the fault. In some conditions, the utility system may also suffer increased 
power flows, leading to an overload or overvoltage condition or even a blackout. However, the 
solution of this issue is out of the scope of this paper.  
Unlike the synchronous and induction based DER, the impact of IIDER on the conventional 
protection schemes is generally much less pronounced (that is during grid-connected operation), 
as each unit has a limited current output to the network. However, the opposite effect seems to be 
the issue. Based on the previous study of the fault characteristics of inverters [34], the inverters 
are quite sensitive to the system faults, and they will shut down within a very short period after 
the fault. This indicates a risk of nuisance tripping when using inverter connected DER, which is 
undesirable for future wide-spread deployment of them. Possible solutions to this issue may lie 
in two ways: 
? Enhance the controllers of inverter based DER to increase its FRT capability  
? To use more advanced FRT techniques based on an enhanced level of requirements. 
There should be a unified standard for the FRT requirements of inverter connected small 
scale DER. 
IIDER sources are much more problematic in islanded mode of operation. Low fault current 
contribution from IIDER is one of the main challenges to application and coordination of 
conventional overcurrent protection in islanded networks that exhibit an increased number of 
these generators [34], [35]. Methods proposed to tackle some of the protection coordination 
issues that stem from this unique fault response are summarised in Table 3-1. In some prototypes 
of island operation with inverter units, this problem has been avoided by an extreme over 
dimensioning of the inverters. In wider use this does not seem viable. In addition to fault current 
issues, lacking inertia may become a problem where inverters are dominant. For instance the 
concept of virtual inertia is studied to tackle this problem. 
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Table 3-1: Techniques for overcurrent coordination of network protection 
Coordination methods Concept of operation Limitations 
Centralised based adaptive [36], 
[37] 
Offline short circuit calculations 
are performed depending on the 
existing network conditions to 
calculate and coordinate 
protection settings 
Requires extensive measurements 
from the primary system and 
reliability in the case of 
information loss is unclear. Also, 
a model of the network is 
necessary 
Optimisation based [38], [39] Linear programming and genetic 
algorithms are used to coordinate 
overcurrent relays using current 
setting and time multiplier setting 
respectively as constraints 
Optimisation has only been 
applied to an individual 
overcurrent relay setting in each 
case (i.e. either TMS or current 
setting) 
Multi-agent based adaptive [40], 
[41] 
The use of several device and 
feeder agents to achieve set 
coordination goals 
Requires communications 
between devices and assumes 
IEDs contain MAS enabling 
technologies 
 
The methods discussed in Table 3-1 need access to communications infrastructure which is not 
widely available in distribution networks. Moreover, reliance on communications without having 
suitable fallback measures is a risky strategy. Key considerations for successfully deploying such 
schemes are the requirements driven scheme design and rigorous testing methodologies. 
Furthermore, the validation of the functionality of intelligent systems based techniques is rather 
difficult, and avoiding erroneous behaviour can be difficult to prove. 
3.2.3 Reclosing coordination and fuse saving 
Since the majority of faults in a power system are intermittent in nature, automatic reclosers are 
widely used in HV and MV power distribution systems to support the continuous power supply 
throughout the network. The installation of DER can disturb the normal reclosing performance 
of the utility in the following ways: 
 
? The fault arc might not dissipate and fully clear before reclosing, since DER units will 
continue to energize the faulted line. This effect turns a potentially intermittent fault into 
a permanent fault and the utility equipment is likely to suffer from a shortened lifespan. 
Likewise, the DER unit (s) themselves can be damaged.  
? The reclosing procedure causes a short period of islanding of the DER, which is likely to 
lead to an out-of-synchronism condition with the utility system. Circuit reclosure can be 
hindered by this. 
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To prevent this problem, one method is to extend the setting to 1-2 sec [42], which might not be 
feasible for the networks feeding sensitive customers. An alternative is to have faster tripping of 
DER on islanding detection. Nevertheless, there may be a conflict between the FRT capability of 
DER and the use of reclosers. Other options could be to add a synch check function or a “dead” 
voltage monitoring function before allowing reclosing.  However these require the installation of 
voltage transformers at both sides of the automatic circuit recloser. 
In an LV distribution system, the contribution from DER can disturb the fuse saving strategy 
[42]. It might be preferred to replace the fuses with circuit breakers, if a high penetration of DER 
is to be achieved. 
3.3 Islanding protection 
Engineering recommendations such as G59/2 [22] and standards such as IEEE 1547 [23] dictate 
that DER should be disconnected when a loss of mains connection (islanding) occurs. This is due 
to: 
? Safety hazards to utility personnel during grid disconnection, with DER maintaining 
supply to the islanded network. 
? Risk of out of phase reclosure between the islanded network and the grid due to DER 
supply frequency drift. 
? Inability of DER to maintain power quality limits. 
In most cases, loss of mains (LOM) condition can be easily detected by under/over frequency 
and/or under/over voltage and/or over current relays. It depends on the amount of load change 
seen by the DER and the time duration of the utility system failure. If the load increases above 
the capability of the DER, the simple methods listed above can be used to detect the LOM 
conditions. However, when load step change is small and remains within the capacity of DER, a 
dedicated LOM protection should be added. 
LOM protection is achieved via a number of methods that are discussed in this section. The non-
detection zone (NDZ) defines a limitation and performance measure for most commonly used 
methods due to low power import or export through the point of common coupling (PCC) [43]. 
At the same time severe network disturbances can result in spurious tripping of the most 
commonly used LOM protection techniques. 
3.3.1 Existing methods 
There are four commonly applied protection functions that are used for LOM protection. All of 
which are of a passive nature (i.e. do not actively introduce perturbations in the primary system): 
? Under and over voltage protection (UV, OV). 
? Under and over frequency protection (UF, OF). 
? Rate of change of frequency (ROCOF). 
? Voltage shift (VS). 
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The first two methods allow for straightforward detection of islanding due to the effect of 
load/generation mismatch on the voltage and frequency. However, when there is a smaller 
mismatch between those, the detection of loss of mains becomes more difficult. To this end 
ROCOF and VS aim to address this issue. 
Sensitivity and stability performance tests of ROCOF and VS as reported in [44] have revealed 
great disparity in performance between LOM relays supplied by different manufacturers. 
Furthermore, careful attention must be paid to the type and size of generator when selecting a 
suitable LOM setting. This highlights the need for improved LOM detection methods 
specifically, and DER protection methods in general. 
3.3.2 Improved islanding detection techniques 
To mitigate some of the performance shortfalls of existing islanding protection practices, the 
methods proposed in literature have been mainly based on new passive methods, active methods 
or communications based methods. The first set summarised in Table 3-2 of techniques rely on 
the use of enhanced frequency measurements techniques for improved LOM detection and are 
usually incremental improvements of existing methods. While the second set relies on injecting 
primary quantities into the network which act to destabilise the LOM protection should an 
islanding event occur. These are summarised in Table 3-3. The final group of techniques utilise 
communications (usually predefined breaker status information or remote frequency 
measurements) to determine the onset of an islanding condition. The communication based LOM 
methods are summarised in Table 3-4.  
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Table 3-2: Passive methods for improved LOM protection 
Passive Method Concept of operation Limitations 
Accumulated phase angle drift [45] An accumulation of phase 
difference between measured 
frequency and a historic based 
system frequency estimator is used 
to detect LOM 
Extrapolation of 
system frequency 
based on historic 
samples depends on 
a number of system 
and DER 
parameters 
Change of harmonic distortion [46] Monitoring of total harmonic 
distortion (THD) levels before and 
after islanding is used as indicator 
for LOM 
Sensitivity depends 
on load and 
inverter interface 
Directional reactive power detection [47] DER is setup as a continuous sink 
of VARs during grid connected 
condition so that a LOM event 
would result in a detectable reverse 
flow of VARs at the generator 
interface 
DER must be setup 
to absorb VARs 
under normal 
operation. It is also 
not suitable where 
capacitor banks are 
present or the 
associated cable 
network has 
significant 
capacitance 
Rate of change of voltage and power factor 
[48] 
A combination of rate of change of 
voltage and change of power factor 
to detect LOM. 
Hard to establish 
the limits as the 
tripping criteria 
change according 
to the system 
conditions and 
those are identified 
after extensive 
simulation 
scenarios 
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Table 3-3: Active methods for improved LOM protection 
Active Methods Concept of operation Limitations 
VAR export error detection [49] DER is set to export a set level of 
reactive power which can only be 
maintained through grid connection 
Slow operation 
since a time delay 
is necessary to 
prevent spurious 
tripping due to load 
fluctuations 
Fault level monitoring [49] Compares short circuit levels under 
grid-connected and islanded conditions 
using a small current injection across 
an inductor to produce a voltage signal 
indication of LOM 
Assumes constant 
source impedance 
and requires power 
electronics for the 
current injection 
Phase or frequency shift [47] Positive feedback based introduction 
of phase shift is stabilised during grid 
connection but significant frequency 
change occurs during islanding 
Operating 
characteristic 
contains stable 
zones even during 
islanded operation 
Active frequency drift [47] Introducing periods of zero current 
during the inverter output cycle results 
in detectable continuous shifting in 
voltage frequency during islanding 
Sensitive to load 
power factor and 
can be ineffective 
under off-nominal 
frequency 
operation 
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Table 3-4:  Communications based methods for improved LOM protection 
Communication-based methods Concept of operation Limitations 
COROCOF [50] Localised effect of LOM on 
island frequency is used to for 
normal ROCOF operation while 
widespread frequency 
disturbances are detected by 
blocking relays placed at specific 
points.  
Scheme stability is dependent on 
blocking relay placement  
Centralised IEC 61850 [51] Topological information is used 
to provide an extensible means of 
identifying LOM conditions 
without measuring analogue 
quantities 
Faster GOOSE performance 
assumes IEC 61850 device 
compliance 
Satellite based [52] Comparison of locally measured 
frequency is compared to a 
master frequency measurement 
transmitted over satellite links. 
Hardware investment required for 
signal reception and transmission. 
Also, the timing signal is locked 
into a single provider 
Internet based [53] Utilises internet infrastructure to 
enable communicating a 
reference system frequency or 
inter-trips to DER protection 
The internet does not guarantee 
quality of service and the method 
assumes suitable internet 
connectivity at DER site 
 
Although the techniques summarised above offer improved performance from both the DER and 
network perspectives, there are a number of challenges that need to be overcome. These 
techniques are non-standard approaches to established protection practice which introduces an 
element of risk to the network by introducing largely unproven technology. The use of active 
methods relies on destabilising the protection through active injection of primary quantities into 
the primary system which could have undesirable operational repercussions. For this reason, 
active methods are not used. Additional capital investment is also usually required to perform 
these functions. 
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3.4 Coordination with Fault ride­through (FRT)  
According to the Distribution Code, any generators connected to distribution system, which 
contribute to the maintenance of system security, are required to have FRT capability [54]. The 
most typical example is the wind turbines, which at present are mostly designed to offer FRT 
capabilities. Nevertheless, for other types of DER, especially for units with low rated power, no 
FRT capabilities are required. Furthermore, until now, there is no consistent international 
standard for FRT regulation. 
Typically, DER in the UK is required to ride-though solid three phase faults on the super-grid 
voltage lasting up to 140ms. The ride-though capability of DER for different voltage dips and 
durations for the UK are defined in [4] and this differs between on-shore and off-shore DER. 
Figure 3-1 shows an example FRT specification for an off-shore wind farm where V/Vn is the 
ratio of wind farm voltage to that of the nominal voltage (on the LV side). 
 
Figure 3-1: FRT requirement for an off-shore wind farm [44] 
 
Crowbar protection is a standard application for DFIG based wind farms in order to protect the 
power electronics from high fault current by acting to short the rotor windings such that the 
machine operates as an induction generator. The introduction and removal of the crowbar is 
controlled through power electronics which results in fast reaction to faults. This rotor based 
strategy suffers from inability to support the system voltage through reactive power export as the 
machine absorbs reactive power during the ride-though period [54] 
Another strategy entails the immediate interruption of stator current which effectively removes 
the generator from the grid. That is followed by a resynchronisation procedure based on the grid 
voltage level. This stator side technique offers the advantage of full current controllability during 
the ride-though period. However, more power electronics are required to achieve this compared 
to the crowbar method [55]. 
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The use of FACTS is also an effective means of achieving fault ride-through by providing 
reactive power necessary to maintain the generator stability. Otherwise the generators are 
generally unable to provide this necessary reactive power especially during voltage dips. 
Increasing stability margins and limiting short circuit currents aid in maintaining generator 
stability [56]. It is important to note, however, that this requires a separate network investment 
and these devices are used for targeted transmission network support. In a similar manner energy 
storage systems can modulate the excess or deficit active or reactive power to better support the 
distributed generator during fault conditions. 
Switching of a series resistor (series dynamic breaking resistor) can provide circuit damping 
along with the boosting of stator side voltage. However, this is not as flexible as using FACTS 
since its performance is limited by the power factor [56]. Superconducting fault current limiters 
can provide a similar function while dissipating the excess energy of the disturbance [57]. 
3.5 Validation challenges of improved DER protection techniques 
De-risking of new DER protection techniques requires rigorous testing. Although desktop 
simulations are invaluable in evaluating the performance of these schemes under different 
primary system conditions and DER operational modes, technology maturity cannot be 
demonstrated. Neither can integration issues be overcome using such testing methods. 
Laboratory based testing offers a powerful means of bridging the gap between proof of concept 
and field deployment of some of these protection solutions. Laboratory based testing can still 
make use of model elements through a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) setup [58]. Alternatively, 
miniature physical testing grids along with flexible inverter devices can be used. The utilisation 
of flexible inverters is emphasised as different generation technologies can be emulated for 
testing the DER protection. Figure 3-2 illustrates these different elements. 
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Figure 3-2: Model and physical elements for DER protection testing 
 
Some of the improved approaches discussed earlier present new challenges to existing testing 
methodologies, especially those which are directly influenced by the primary system dynamics. 
So in addition to providing accurate DER models (or indeed physical inverters) for testing, it is 
important to consider network operational scenarios. These are becoming more influential in 
shaping DER protection performance. Hence exhaustive scenario based testing is becoming 
increasingly more important. 
Active LOM protection methods as well as the use of FACTS and similar technologies to enable 
fault ride-though of DER can result in unique system dynamics that are not catered for in 
existing testing practices. Therefore, the scope of testing should be extended through the 
inclusion of these devices or suitable models in the testing arrangement. 
The use of communications in LOM and network protection adds another dimension to the 
testing considerations. The reliability of the communications must be evaluated along with the 
impact on protection performance in the case of loss of communication. 
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4 DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROTECTION TESTING 
4.1 Introduction 
From the early beginning of power system protection there has been a need for testing of 
protection relays. The first generation of relays, which were electromechanical, were tested with 
heavy current test benches consisting of  mains coupled sources, phase shifters, reactors and load 
units. These tests were limited to steady state accuracy tests. 
When the technology and development of protection relays moved on from electromechanical 
relays to analogue relays also analogue test simulators became available. This generation of test 
sets consisted of low-level independent signal generators and signal amplifiers for amplification 
of the signals to levels required at the inputs of the analogue protection relays. With these 
analogue simulators the response of protection relays to different fault scenarios could be 
investigated. 
With the introduction of numerical digital relays and also more sophisticated microprocessor-
based test sets, open and closed loop (real time) digital simulators and open loop playback 
equipment have been introduced. Although the protection functions of digital and analogue 
relays are essentially very similar, the digital technology offers new possibilities and new 
problems due to the increasing complexity of relays and the trend towards communication based 
scheme logics as opposed to more traditional hardwired approaches. 
Due to the increasing complexity and the great importance of some applications, type testing has 
become increasingly more important. This chapter describes different types of type testing, 
including both static and dynamic approaches. 
4.2 Type testing classification 
Type testing can be classified as certification or application conformance testing. Certification 
type testing is normally performed by a certification organization or by a testing company under 
the supervision of a certification organization, while application tests are performed by a 
manufacturer or a testing company on request for a specific end-user, for example a utility [59]. 
The way certification type tests are performed varies in each country, depending on the existing 
regulations. For more detailed review of certification standards, please, refer to chapter 4. 
Certification type tests are normally performed:  
? At the end of development of a new protection relay  
? After software upgrade of the protection relay 
? After the addition of a new function  
? After hardware upgrade of the protection relay 
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Certification type tests concern normalized tests under normalised procedures, the so-called 
conformance and performance tests, which aim at verifying the conformance of the protection 
relay against its specifications. These tests are generally related to international standards, such 
as IEC 60255 and ANSI C37.90. However compliance may also involve consideration of the 
requirements of IEC 61000, 60068 and 60529, while products intended for use in the EEC also 
have to comply with the requirements of Directives 89/336/EEC and 73/23/EEC [60]. Since type 
testing of a digital or numerical relay involves testing of software as well as hardware, the type 
testing process is very complicated and more involved than a static or electromechanical relay. 
Functional conformance tests verify the functionality of the protection against the test standard 
specification. The functional conformance tests consist of applying the appropriate inputs to the 
relay under test and measuring the performance to determine if it meets the specification. They 
are usually carried out under controlled environmental conditions. The testing may be extensive, 
therefore to minimize the required time to perform these tests, dedicated test sets have been 
developed [61]. These types of tests are also called static type testing. Please, refer to subsection 
4.2.1 for more information. 
Technological conformance tests consider how the protection relay responds to external 
disturbances. To a great extent, these characteristics can be uncoupled from the type of relay and 
are valid for the whole family range. Practically, these tests cover:  
? Electro Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) tests 
? Product safety type tests 
? Environmental type tests 
EMC tests are carried out to determine the ability of relays to withstand the electrical 
environment in which they are installed. The substation environment is a very severe 
environment in terms of the electrical and electromagnetic interference that can arise. There are 
many sources of interference within a substation, some originating internally, others being 
conducted along the overhead lines or cables into the substation from external disturbances. The 
most common sources are: switching operations, system faults, lightning, flashovers [60]. 
Product safety type tests are carried out to demonstrate that the product is safe when used for its 
intended application. The essential requirements are that the relay is safe and will not cause an 
electric shock or fire hazard under normal conditions and in the presence of faults. A number of 
specific tests to prove this include: dielectric voltage withstand, insulation withstand for over 
voltages, overload and fault condition assessment, etc [60]. 
Environmental type test are conducted to prove that a relay can withstand the effects of the 
environment in which it is expected to work and they consist of temperature, humidity, enclosure 
protection and mechanical tests [60]. 
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Application tests are carried out to demonstrate that a protection scheme is capable to protect a 
type of network under certain fault conditions. These tests are normally asked by the end-user, 
such as a utility: 
? To study the behaviour of protection relays in a particular power network before new 
protection installation or change in the primary system 
? In case of troubleshooting mal-operation 
? To optimise settings in case of complicated networks 
Application tests are based on the use of transients for testing protective relays in order to 
simulate the dynamic behaviour of the network during faults and test the protection system 
performance. 
Generally, there are two ways of creating dynamic type tests:  
? Using transients obtained from recorded or calculated waveforms. In this case, a test set 
can be used to playback a recorded waveform or to generate a calculated waveform that 
represents a transient of the network.   
? Using transients calculated in real time. In this case, a real time digital simulator is used 
to simulate the network during normal and fault conditions. 
4.2.1 Static type testing 
Static type testing consists of applying inputs to a protection relay and measuring the 
performance to determine if it meets the specification or not. 
Static type testing is normally extensive and it includes a high number of tests. For example, 
considering an overcurrent protection relay, some of the typical static type tests are: three phase 
pick-up and drop off accuracy, accuracy of DT timer, accuracy of IDMT curves, accuracy of 
reset timers, etc. All the tests are done over the complete range of settings. 
One example of static type test technique is the ramping technique, which is used to determine 
limiting values, such as minimum pick-up or switching hysteresis (e.g. pick-up/drop-off ratio). 
The software controls the amplifier and commands it to generate ramps of amplitude, phase, or 
frequency for the current and voltage outputs and the response of the relay is recorded 
automatically. 
This is normally done using a protection test set which generates series of waveforms and 
records the response of the protection device. Figure 4-1 shows the typical static type testing 
hardware environment. 
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Figure 4-1: Static type testing hardware environment 
The hardware normally involved in a static type testing is: a protection test set, a personal 
computer and the protection relay to be tested.  
The personal computer is used for both configuring the protection relay using the relay’s 
manufacture software configuration and to manage the protection testing using the protection test 
set software.  
The protection test set generates voltages and currents and records the tripping signals received 
by the protection relay. If the protection relay is fully IEC61850 compliant, sample values 
substitute the analogue values and GOOSE messages are used instead of signalling via relay 
contacts. 
4.2.2 Dynamic type testing 
Dynamic type tests consist of simulating transients of a network model in real time to 
dynamically demonstrate the satisfactory performance of protection relays. 
In the past, dynamic type tests were conducted by using physical scaled down models of 
electrical power systems, e.g. artificial transmission lines. However, these models had significant 
limitations in the current and voltage waveforms that could be generated and their use required a 
lot of time because testing automation was not possible. 
With the evolution of microprocessors, a new generation of real time digital simulators based on 
distributed microprocessor hardware has been developed and it is now widely used to conduct 
closed-loop testing of physical devices, including protection relays and protection schemes. 
Real time power system simulators are a combination of advanced computer hardware and 
comprehensive software. These simulators can solve the power system equations fast enough to 
continuously produce output conditions that realistically represent conditions in the real network. 
Therefore, the physical protection equipment can be connected in closed-loop regime with the 
power system model and can be subjected to virtually all possible faults and operating conditions 
including complex fault scenarios with multiple relays and communication channels [62].  
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Figure 4-2 shows the typical dynamic type testing hardware environment, where the real time 
digital simulator simulates the primary system and the protection scheme to be tested, which can 
be formed by one or more protection relays, receives voltages and currents amplified by slave 
analogue amplifiers.  
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Figure 4-2:  Dynamic type testing hardware environment 
 
When the protection equipment is IEC 61850-9-2 sampled value compliant, voltages and 
currents are provided to the protection equipment through a dedicated interface able to send 
sampled values to the protection equipment instead of using the amplifiers. 
The protection response to faults, such as trip and reclose signals, is then sent back to the 
simulator to operate the breakers modelled in the simulation. If the protection provides signals 
via conventional dry contacts, the signal will be received by the simulator using its digital input 
card, while if the protection equipment is IEC 61850 compliant the breaker commands can be 
imported into the simulation using a dedicated IEC 61850 interface card. 
With the real time simulation and the protection equipment connected in a closed-loop regime 
the protection can be subjected to a myriad of faults and operating scenarios.  
The faults and operating scenarios can be run manually or using automated batch files. The 
automated batch is often applied to protection system testing where faults are repeated again and 
again with small changes to the fault inception angle, fault type, fault location, etc. In this way 
the overall time of testing is significantly reduced. 
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4.3 Approaches to approvals and standardisation 
4.3.1 Approaches to approval [Germany] 
In Germany the registered non-profit association FGW (Federation of German Windpower and 
other Renewable Energies) has developed a technical guideline for approval of technical 
behaviour of wind turbines and other DER. In the third part of this technical guideline (FGW 
TR3, [63]) measurement methods and test procedures for the approval of the electrical behaviour 
of DER units according to the MV Distribution Code of BDEW [12] are described. This also 
comprises testing of protection devices. Based on the technical guidelines given by FGW a 
certification process has been established. Unit / plant certificates are a prerequisite for DER 
units’ / plants’ connection to the German power system. The technical guidelines given by FGW 
are ground-breaking for standards like e.g. IEC 61400-21[9] – new standards are being 
developed. 
4.3.2 Approaches to approval [United Kingdom] 
In the UK, the Energy Networks Association (ENA) co-operates with manufacturers in assessing 
protection relays and, if necessary, in witnessing type tests which include electrical, 
environmental, software, and dynamic validation. Equipment that meets the specified criteria is 
given an ENA Notice of Conformity Certificate through the appropriate Protection Assessment 
Panel (PAP) which is made up of representatives from the Distribution and Transmission 
Network Operators. 
This assessment is not compulsory but utilities normally require ENA Notice of Conformity 
Certificate, consequently manufactures voluntarily do the assessment process with ENA for 
every new protection relay type they want to introduce in the UK market. 
The procedure relies initially on self-certification by the manufacturer with possible visits and 
witnessing of tests by specialists engineers on behalf of the UK Electricity Industry (EI). 
The assessment includes the following areas: 
? Quality of the manufacture 
? Type tests to relevant standards 
? Verification of conformance with standards and technical specifications 
? Performance or functional tests to agreed criteria 
? Site tests and/or field trials 
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5 TEST CASE STUDY 
This section describes a case study on dynamic type testing of a DER interconnection protection 
relay. The testing was performed at the University of Strathclyde using a commercial protection 
relay and a real-time digital simulator (RTDS). 
5.1 Methodology 
The aim of this case study is to run a dynamic type testing of a DER interface protection relay, 
using network data of a section of a typical MV distribution network and recommended relay 
settings of both UK and German grid codes [12], [22]. Firstly, the considered network section is 
modelled in the power system simulation software RSCAD. The model includes the upstream 
network source, transformers, lines, transducers, circuit breakers, loads and a synchronous 
machine representing the DER unit for which the relay under examination will be configured. 
After compilation of the simulation the power system model is uploaded to the RTDS. 
Meanwhile the protection relay is prepared for testing by configuring the settings for the 
different protection functions under- and overvoltage, under- and overfrequency and ROCOF 
(Rate Of Change Of Frequency). Having saved different setting files according to both UK and 
German grid code recommendations, the relay is connected in a closed-loop arrangement to the 
RTDS. The test set-up used to perform the case study is shown in Figure 5-1. 
  
Figure 5-1 Test set-up with real-time digital simulator (left), and protection relay with amplifier (right) 
 
During the test different protection functions under examination are activated one by one, firstly 
with UK and secondly with German recommended settings. Different test scenarios are 
simulated by applying faults in different locations and by changing from interconnected to 
islanded operation mode respectively  
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5.2 System model and test scenarios 
5.2.1 System model 
The single line diagram for the network under examination is presented in Figure 5-2. In the 
system model, the upstream 33 kV network is represented by an infinite bus. The distribution 
network section comprises a 33 kV / 11 kV transformer (T1) and two 11 kV feeders. At the left 
hand side feeder (Feeder A) there is a variable load (load A) and an 11 kV / 0.4 kV transformer 
(T2) with a synchronous machine connected at the LV side. The machine rating and parameters 
are set according to the hardware lab unit (220 kVA) of Fraunhofer IWES. At the right hand side 
feeder (Feeder B) there is a variable load (load B). The synchronous machine at the end of feeder 
A is protected by the circuit breaker CBDG which is controlled by the DER interconnection 
protection relay under test. 
 
Figure 5-2: Network section considered in the case study 
 
 
The model system data for network, transformer and generator is given in the Appendix. The 
graphical user interface for controlling the RTDS is shown in Figure 5-3. 
Feeder A 
Feeder B 
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Figure 5-3: RSCAD / RTDS user interface for modelling (left screen) and simulation (right screen) 
 
 
5.2.2 Test scenarios 
 
A number of test scenarios have been developed to test the performance of the DER 
interconnection protection relay. The protection functions to be investigated are as follows: 
? Under- and overvoltage protection (UV, OV). 
? Under- and overfrequency protection (UF, OF). 
? Rate of change of frequency (ROCOF). 
The relay settings indicated in Table 5-1 are taken according to both UK [22] and German grid 
code recommendations [12]. The settings are implemented on the protection relay as two 
separate setting groups and saved to setting files. (Note: The maximum time delay which can be 
set on the relay under examination is 10s. Therefore, the two values in brackets given by the grid 
code recommendations cannot be realized). 
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Table 5-1: Relay settings applied for the case study, according to UK and German recommendations 
for DER unit interconnection protection, i.e. small power station HV (MV) connected 
UK recommended settings German recommended settings Protection function 
(with ANSI device number) Setting Time Setting Time 
Undervoltage 27, stage 1 U< 0.87 Un 2.5 s 0.80 Un 1.0 s 
Undervoltage 27, stage 2 U<< 0.80 Un 500 ms 0.45 Un 300 ms 
Overvoltage 59, stage 1 U> 1.10 Un 1.0 s - - 
Overvoltage 59, stage 2 U>> 1.13 Un 500 ms 1.15 Un 100 ms 
Underfrequency 81U, stage 1 f< 47.5 Hz 10 s (20 s) - - 
Underfrequency 81U, stage 2 f<< 47 Hz 500 ms 47.5 Hz 100 ms 
Overfrequency 81O, stage 1 f> 51.5 Hz 10 s (90 s) - - 
Overfrequency 81O, stage 2 f>> 52 Hz 500 ms 51.5 Hz 100 ms 
LOM / ROCOF 0.125 Hz/s #  - - 
     
# with 0.125 Hz/s for low impedance networks and 0.2 Hz/s for high impedance networks. ? “A fault level of less 
than 10 % of the system design maximum fault level should be classed as high impedance.” 
 
By either applying faults in different locations or changing from interconnected to islanding 
operation mode different scenarios are created. These are as follows: 
? Undervoltage protection testing by applying faults (phase A to ground) in islanded mode 
? Overvoltage protection testing by load shedding in islanded mode 
? Underfrequency protection testing by simulating genuine islanded situation (DER unit 
supplying a higher load than its output prior to LOM) 
? Overfrequency protection testing by simulating genuine islanded situation (DER unit 
supplying a lower load than its output prior to LOM) 
? ROCOF testing by intentional islanding (DER supplying both higher and lower load) 
 
The relay settings for all tests are applied according to Table 5-1. 
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5.2.2.1 Undervoltage  testing  by  applying  faults  (phase  A  to  ground)  in  islanded 
mode 
The undervoltage function is tested by intentional islanding of the network section with 
transformer T2 in YNyn connection. Load A is disconnected and load B set to 200 kW, 
11 kVAr. To test protection sensitivity a phase-A-to-ground fault is applied at fault location 2 
(refer to Figure 5-2) for a duration of 0.4 s and 0.6 s (UK) and 0.6 s and 1.2 s (Germany) 
respectively. The fault resistance is initially set to 1000 Ohm then gradually reduced in steps of 
100 Ohm. 
The single-phase fault applied within this test is a high resistive fault, which is in the power 
range of a large switchable load. For instance, a fault resistance of 1000 Ohm may be compared 
to a single-phase load of  
 . 
5.2.2.2 Overvoltage testing by load shedding in islanded mode 
The overvoltage function is tested in islanded operation mode of the network section, with 
transformer T2 in YNyn connection, load A set to 10 kW, 11 kvar and load B set to 200 kW, 
11 kvar. CBA is opened manually to create overvoltage conditions. 
5.2.2.3 Underfrequency testing by islanding (DER unit supplying a high load) 
The overfrequency function is tested in grid-connected operation mode of the network section, 
with transformer T2 in Dyn5 connection, load A set to 10 kW, 11 kvar and load B set to 400 kW, 
11 kvar. CBGrid is then opened to island the network section. 
5.2.2.4 Overfrequency testing by islanding (DER unit supplying a low load) 
The overfrequency function is tested in grid-connected operation mode of the network section, 
with transformer T2 in Dyn5 connection, load A set to 10 kW, 11 kvar and load B set to 10 kW, 
1 kvar. CBGrid is then opened to island the network section. 
5.2.2.5 ROCOF testing by islanding (DER supplying high / low load) 
The test is only done with UK settings as there are no specifications for ROCOF given in the 
German guidelines. A value of 0.125 Hz/s cannot be set in the relay. Therefore the test is done 
for both 0.1 Hz/s and 0.2 Hz/s. The same network switching actions performed in the 
underfrequency and overfrequency scenarios were used to test ROCOF. 
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5.3 Test results 
5.3.1 Undervoltage testing by applying faults (phase A to ground) in islanded mode 
With a fault resistance of 1000 Ohm no tripping occurs. With a fault resistance of 900 Ohm and 
less the relay trips for fault durations of 0.6 s (UK) and 1.2 s (Germany) respectively. This 
corresponds to the UK undervoltage setting stage 2 of 0.8 Vn / 0.5 s and the German 
undervoltage setting stage 1 of 0.8 Vn / 1.0 s. 
Example simulated current and voltage waveforms are presented in Figure 5-3. 
To make sure that the relay does not trip on overvoltage, due the voltage rise at the two healthy 
phases, the test is repeated with functions V> and V>> disabled. The relay still trips for 
900 Ohms \ 0.6 s (UK settings).  
 
 
Figure 5-3: Voltages and currents at the DER for a fault with a resistance of 900 Ohm and a duration 
of 0.6 s (German settings) 
 
5.3.2 Overvoltage testing by load shedding in islanded mode 
Having opened circuit breaker CBA the relay trips after 0.5 s (UK) and 0.1 s (Germany) 
respectively. 
5.3.3 Underfrequency testing by islanding (DER unit supplying a high load) 
By opening circuit breaker CBGrid the network section is islanded and the generator suddenly has 
to supply a very high load. The load is much higher than the maximum power output of the 
generator and as a consequence frequency drops to 46.7 Hz which is below the setting value of 
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47.0 Hz (UK) and 47.5 Hz (Germany). After a set time delay of 500 ms (UK) and 100 ms 
(Germany) the relay trips on underfrequency. 
If the same test is repeated with load A set to 200 kW, 11 kvAr, the frequency only goes down to 
49.75 Hz and no tripping occurs as the maximum generator output roughly matches the load. 
5.3.4 Overfrequency testing by islanding (DER unit supplying a low load) 
By opening circuit breaker CBGrid the network section gets islanded and the generator suddenly 
produces a surplus of power, as feeding energy back to the grid is no longer possible. The load is 
much lower than the power output prior to islanding and as a consequence frequency rises to 
approximately 52.3 Hz which is above the setting value of 52.0 Hz (UK) and 51.5 Hz 
(Germany). After a set time delay of 500 ms (UK) and 100 ms (Germany) the relay trips on 
overfrequency. 
 
5.3.5 ROCOF testing by simulating an islanding condition 
For both scenarios (decrease and rise in frequency) the protection relay trips for 0.1 Hz/s as well 
as for 0.2 Hz/s. 
 
5.4 Summary 
The tests carried out show that the DER interconnection protection relay trips in accordance with 
the applied settings under both UK and German setting practice. 
The RTDS based test scenarios described in this chapter are not intended to be an exhaustive set 
of relay testing procedures but have been included primarily as an illustrative example of the 
methodology and complexities involved in the testing of modern DER interface protection 
relays. It needs to be emphasized that realistic testing conditions (achieved here using RTDS but 
also possible using power hardware laboratory) should form an essential part of protection 
performance assessment. The level of testing attained using conventional static testing 
procedures is usually inadequate and can lead to unexpected behaviour in real power system 
conditions, e.g. spurious tripping of LOM protection resulting from fleared faults on adjacent 
circuits. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The protection white book has presented a review of the issues surrounding the impact of 
increasing levels of DER on the generator and network protection and the resulting necessary 
improvements in protection testing practices. Particular focus was placed on ever increasing 
inverter-interfaced DER installations and the challenges of utility network integration.  
In terms of testing practices emphasis was made on the importance of dynamic testing that can 
only be delivered through laboratory-based platforms such as real-time simulators, integrated 
substation automation infrastructure and flexible, inverter-equipped testing microgrids. The 
combination of the emerging flexible network operation and new DER technologies underline 
the importance of utilising the laboratory testing facilities available within the DERlab Network 
of Excellence. This not only informs the shaping of new protection testing and network 
integration practices by end users but also enables the process of de-risking new DER protection 
technologies. 
A comparative case study of interface protection based on the UK and German DER protection 
practice was also presented. This experimental work highlights further the difficulties associated 
with standardisation and approval mechanisms adopted by different countries and reinforces the 
need for better standardisation solutions in the near future. 
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APPENDIX: SYSTEM MODEL DATA 
Network data 
Source parameters 
Short-circuit power SSC”max:   119.7 MVA 
R/X ratio:     1.22 
 
Line parameters 
Type of line:     Overhead line 
Rated voltage:     11 kV 
Nominal frequency:    50 Hz 
Resistance R’ (pos. \ neg. sequence):  0.12 Ohm/km 
Reactance X’ (pos. \ neg. sequence):  0.16 Ohm/km 
Resistance R’ (zero sequence):  0.5 Ohm/km 
Reactance X’ (zero sequence):  1.1 Ohm/km 
Length of line 1:    5 km 
Length of line 2:    5 km 
Length of line 3:    5 km 
 
Transformer data 
Transformer T1 
Primary rated voltage:   33 kV 
Secondary rated voltage:   11 kV 
Connection group:    Dyn 
Rated power:     24MVA 
Nominal frequency:    50 Hz 
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Transformer T2 
Primary rated voltage:   11 kV 
Secondary rated voltage:   0.4 kV 
Connection group:    YNyn0, Dyn5 (adjustable) 
Rated power:     0.25MVA 
Nominal frequency:    50 Hz 
 
Generator data 
Type of generator:    Synchronous machine 
Nominal apparent power:   220 kVA 
Nominal voltage:    0.4 kV 
Power factor:     Unity 
Synchronous reactances  xd:  1.79 p.u. 
    xq:  1.71 p.u. 
Transient reactance   xd’:  0.169 p.u. 
Subtransient reactance  xd”:  0.135 p.u. 
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